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Selective Enforcement of Immigration Laws on the Basis
of Nationality as an Instrument of Foreign Policy
I.

Introduction

Until recently, the President of the United States had not attempted to implement foreign policy by regulating aliens in the country through selective enforcement of immigration laws based on nationality. Besides the dubious causal
relationship between selectively enforcing immigration laws and achieving foreign policy objectives, such presidential action is vulnerable to challenge on fifth
amendment equal protection grounds.' The question is: Under what circumstances do the equal protection rights of aliens outweigh the authority over immigration and foreign affairs vested in the federal government? The answer
depends upon (1) whether the courts label the presidential action as deriving
from the immigration power as well as the foreign affairs power; (2) the degree of
judicial scrutiny given the President's justifications for discriminating among
aliens in enforcing immigration laws; and (3) the equal protection standard applied to federal discrimination based on national origin. This note will explore
the constitutional boundaries of this largely dormant foreign policy instrument.
After evaluating the three factors outlined above, the note will conclude by suggesting ways the courts could combine the factors in reviewing the President's use
of this foreign policy instrument.
II.

The NarenjY Decisions

The Supreme Court of the United States has not yet addressed the validity
of selective enforcement of immigration laws on the basis of nationality as an
instrument of foreign policy. Recently, however, the United States Court of Appeals and the United States District Court for the District of Columbia tackled
the issue in Narenji v. Civi/etti,2 a consolidated class action filed on behalf of nonimmigrant 3 students of Iranian nationality. This case involved the President's
first assertion of his foreign affairs power in the enforcement of immigration laws
to regulate aliens of a particular nationality residing in the United States.
On November 4, 1979, a group of Iranians invaded and occupied the United
States Embassy in Tehran, Iran, taking approximately sixty-five American citizens as hostages. On November 10, 1979, President Jimmy Carter responded to
I The Supreme Court in Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962), held that "the conscious exercise of
some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation." However, there are
grounds for claiming an equal protection violation if the selective enforcement is "deliberately based upon
an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Id See also Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
2 481 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C.) (unconstitutional), revId, 617 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (constitutional),

cert. denmed, 446 U.S. 957 (1980).
3 A nonimmigrant is a person who comes to the United States for a temporary sojourn. He is regarded as a visitor who does not plan to transfer allegiance to the United States. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1101(a)(15)(A)-(L)

(1976); 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE

§ 2.6a (rev. perm. ed. 1980).
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this breach of international law 4 by directing the Attorney General to "identify
any Iranian students in the United States who are not in compliance with the
terms of their entry visas, and to take the necessary steps to commence deportation proceedings against those who have violated applicable immigration laws
and regulations."' 5 Three days later, pursuant to his authority under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,6 the Attorney General issued a regulation
immediately effective and applicable only to Iranian students. 7 The regulation
required nonimmigrant post-secondary students of Iranian nationality to report
to the Immigration and Nationality Service (INS) and present their passports
together with evidence of school enrollment, payment of fees, course load, good
standing, and their current address. 8 Noncompliance or willfully supplying false
information would subject the students to immediate deportation proceedings. 9
The students brought suit in federal district court for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that the regulation violated their fifth amendment rights
by discriminating on the basis of national origin.' 0 The district court held the
regulation unconstitutional, stating that to hold otherwise would create "a precedent of alarming elasticity from which future extreme assertions of executive
power could readily springboard."" The appellate court reversed, upholding the
constitutonality of the regulation.' 2 Because the Narenji trial and appellate
courts analyzed the constitutionality of the regulation differently, using differing
equal protection standards and levels of scrutiny, their decisions provide grounds
for comparison as well as models of potential judicial review.
III.

Overview of the Implicated Constitutional Rights and Federal Powers

The constitutionality of a presidential foreign policy directive enforcing immigration laws against aliens of a particular nationality depends upon what
rights and powers are implicated by the directive and to whom those rights and
powers belong. A President directing the selective enforcement of immigration
laws must act pursuant to the foreign affairs power, the immigration power, or
both. Unless aliens possess counterbalancing constitutional rights, the propriety
of a presidential directive issued pursuant to these federal powers cannot be questioned.
A. Rzghts of Aliens Within United StatesJurisdiction
Unlike aliens seeking admission to the country,' 3 aliens within United
States territorial jurisdiction enjoy constitutional protection against arbitrary
4 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 386 (8th ed. 1955).
5 Announcement on Actions To Be Taken by the Department of Justice, 15 WEEKLY COMP. OF
PRES. Doc. 2107, 2107 (Nov.10, 1979).

6 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103(a), 1184(a), 1251(a)(9), 1303 (1976).
7 8 C.F.R. § 214.5 (1979), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.65,727 (1979).

8 Id
9 Id § 214.5(b).
10 481 F. Supp. at 1134. The students also claimed violations of the fourth amendment ("compelled
interrogation" by INS officials constituting an illegal seizure), the first amendment (chilling speech), and
the notice and comment provisions of the Administration Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976). Id
11 481 F. Supp. at 1147.

12 A minority of the appellate panel, however, voted to rehear the case, identifying a "grave constitutional issue." 617 F.2d at 755.
13 See M. KONVITZ, CIVIL RIGHTS IN IMMIGRATION 39-53 (1953).
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government action.1 4 The fifth amendment guarantee that no "person" shall be
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law protects even those
whose presence in the United States is unlawful, involuntary or transitory. 15 The
Supreme Court has invalidated state statutes discriminating against aliens in the
areas of state welfare benefits,16 state civil service employment,' 7 private employment,' 8 admission to the bar,' 9 fishing licenses, 20 and land ownership. 2 '
Although the equal protection guarantee implied in the fifth amendment
outlaws invidious discriminatory classifications, it does not forbid every distinction between aliens and citizens. This is particularly true on the federal level.
The Supreme Court has approved Congress's exercise of its broad power over
immigration through rules that would be unacceptable if applied to United
States citizens by the federal government or to aliens or citizens by state governments.2 2 According to the Court, "a legitimate distinction between citizens and
aliens may justify attributes and benefits for one class not accorded to the
other." 23 The difference in protection given aliens by the federal and state systems stems not from differences in the fifth and fourteenth amendments' guarantees, but from the existence of federal powers over immigration and foreign
affairs which have no equivalents on the state level.
B.

The Foreign Ajirs Power

The foreign affairs power is confined to the federal government. 24 It is not
vested in a single branch of the federal government, but rather shared by the
President and Congress. Congress has a valid constitutional claim of concurrent,
if not superior, foreign affairs power because of the grants of legislative power in
Article I, section 8.25 The Constitutional grants Congress the power to regulate
26
commerce with foreign nations, establish a uniform rule of naturalization,27
define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas and offenses
against the law of nations,2 8 declare war, 29 and make necessary and proper
laws. 30 The legislature's other constitutional powers have an indirect yet substantial influence on foreign affairs. The powers to tax,3 1 to authorize spending
14 Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1895); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1885); 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, at § 1.31.

15 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77 (1976).
16 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
17 Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
18 Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
19 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
20 Takahashi v. Fish Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
21 Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
22 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976).
23 Id at 77. The Immigration and Nationality Act also creates classifications among aliens. Setid at
77 n.13.
24 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130
U.S. 581,604 (1889); Holmes v.Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 430 (1841); L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 15-22 (1972); E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT 211-12 (rev. 3d ed. 1948).

25
26
27
28
29
30
31

U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8.
Id cl.3.
Id cl.4.
Id c. 10.
Id. cf. 11.
Id cf. 18.
Id ci. 1.
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to "provide for the common defence and general Welfare of the United States,' '3 2
and to appropriate funds3 3 give Congress bargaining power in conducting foreign policy discussions with the President. On the other hand, the Constitution is
surprisingly silent on presidential foreign affairs power. Article II of the Constitution grants the President the power to make treaties and appoint ambassadors,
34
other public ministers and consuls, subject to the advice and consent of Senate;
35
the duty of receiving ambassadors and other public ministers; the post of Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy;3 6 and the duty to insure the laws are
7
3

faithfully executed.

The President, however, has emerged with the lion's share of the authority
in foreign affairs due to the realities of international relations. Foreign policy
decisions often rquire secrecy and dispatch and invariably require specialized expertise, day-tO'day monitoring, coordination and continuity. Congress, with its
two house network of committees and open debates, is ill equipped to meet these
requirements. Therefore, despite the modest constitutional grants, the President
and the executive officers have gained broad authority over foreign affairs
through judicial decision. 38 The Supreme Court has characterized the presidential foreign affairs power as "very delicate, plenary and exclusive." 39 The Court
has adopted John Marshall's characterization of the President as "the sole organ
of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign
nations. ' 40 Presidential foreign affairs power exists without express constitutional provision 4 ' or act of Congress 42 and includes the power to formulate foreign policy. 43 Although the power to determine foreign policy is now thought to

be vested in the executive branch, attempts have been made to proclaim Congress the source of foreign policy. 44 Today, however, Congress seems content to

influence foreign policy by exercising its legislative powers, adopting foreign policy resolutions, and manipulating spending and appropriations bills.
Theoretically, the power to determine foreign policy is vested in the President and principally executed by the thousands of officials in the executive
branch who are involved in foreign relations. The President, not Congress, in32
33
34
35
36
37

Id
Id
Id
Id
Id
Id

§9, cl. 7.
art. 2, § 2, cl.2.
cl.
3.
cl.1.
§ 3.

38 See, e.g., Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950); C. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 109-10 (1948); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942); United States v. Curtiss-

Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936); Flota Maritima Browning De Cuba v. Motor Vessel Ciudad, 335
F.2d 619 (4th Cir. 1964); Rose v. McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 11, 112 (D.D.C. 1966), afd, 375 F.2d 924
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 856 (1967).
39 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. at 320.
40 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800), cited in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 229 (1942) and
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. at 319.
41 See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
42 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. at 320.
43 L. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 47-48.
44 The best known argument for broad congressional authority is made by Madison's "Helvidius" in
response to Hamilton's "Pacificus." 6J. MADISON, WRrrINGS 138, 147-50 (Hunt ed. 1910), reprintedin R.
HIRSCHFIELD, THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY 40-61 (2d ed. 1973). The House of Representatives went
so far as to resolve that "Congress has a constitutional right to an authoritative voice in declaring and
prescribing the foreign policy of the United States ..... " CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 2d Sess. 65-67
(1864). See L. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 81-85.
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structs executive officers on the extent of their foreign affairs power. Because
Congress has granted some of these officials the power to enforce immigration
laws, 45 they have an opportunity to enforce selectively those laws against aliens of
a particular nationality in the guise of implementing foreign policy. If these officials act without express presidential mandate, they might be acting outside the
scope of their foreign affairs duties delegated by the President. Such action
would likely be invalid. The recent Iranian regulations raised this issue in Yassini
v. Crosland.46 The Ninth Circuit questioned whether the INS's revocation of deferred departure dates originally granted to Iranian nationals due to the unrest in
Iran was "an independent 'renegade' act of foreign policy, or merely an implementation of the President's response to the Iranian crisis."' 4 7 Although the court
found the INS's action implemented the President's foreign policy, it noted that
"serious questions might arise if the INS engaged in foreign policy matters,
outside the scope of its usual functions, with disregard of the [Administrative
'
Procedures Act] and concepts of due process. "48
C.
1.

The Zmmzgration Power

Congressional Authority

Like the foreign affairs power, the immigration power is confined to the federal government. 49 Unlike the foreign affairs power, however, it has historically
been vested in the legislative branch of the federal government. 5 0 The Supreme
Court has consistently recognized Congress's immigration power as "necessarily
very broad, touching. . . basic aspects of national sovereignty, more particularly
our foreign relations and national security." 5 ' Repeatedly, the Court has proclaimed that "over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress
more complete."' 5 2 Congressional control over immigration has been termed exclusive5" and plenary 54 in nature and "as firmly imbedded in the legislative and
55
judicial tissues of the body politic as any aspect of our government."
Congress's immigration power extends beyond mere legislative power over
traditional immigration concerns-requirements for entry into and remaining
within the country-to reach all legislation affecting aliens. If aliens as a group
or a subgroup of aliens is affected by legislation, courts will label the matter as
45 For example, enforcement authority is given the Attorney General by 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1976) and
the Secretary of State by 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (Supp. If 1978).
46 618 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1980).
47
d. at 1358.
48 Id. at 1360. It was similarly apparent to the Narenji district court that the registration of Iranian
students was "a coordinated action on the part of those executive branch officials [the President and
Attorney General] having primary responsibility in the area of foreign policy and in the regulation of
immigration and naturalization." 481 F. Supp. at 1136 n.3.
49 See e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972); Oceanic
Stream Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 (1909).
50 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, at §§ 1.5a, 2.2a.

51 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954).
52 Oceanic Stream Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909). Accord, Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972).
53 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. at 531.
54 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 534 (1952).
55 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. at 531.
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falling under Congress's immigration power. 56 Presidential directives which require immigration laws to be selectively enforced may also be deemed the products of the immigration power.
2.

Executive Authority

The Constitution grants executive officers no immigration powers; their authority over immigration has historically been confined to that delegated to them
by Congress. 5 7 Executive officers charged by Congress with enforcing immigration laws are often given wide discretion and flexibility, 58 but remain subject to
59
judicial scrutiny for actions beyond the scope of their delegated authority.
Narenji v. Civiletti may signal a shift in judicial thought on the question
60
whether executive officers have independent, undelgated immigration power.
The District of Columbia Circuit suggested in Narenji that even in the absence of
statutory authorization, a President exercising his foreign affairs power has authority to enforce selectively immigration laws on the basis of national origin. 61
This suggestion was mere dictum, since the court held both the President and
Attorney General to be acting under express congressional authorization. 62 The
Narenji district court, however, found the President and Attorney General to be
acting outside the immigration powers delgated them by Congress. 6 It then employed the
analysis articulated by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer. 64
Justice Jackson's analysis of proper delegation of congressional and executive power contains three levels. First, a President acting pursuant to express or
implied congressional authorization possesses maximum authority-all of his authority and all Congress can delegate. Only if the "Federal Government as an
56 See e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (federal employment); Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,
426 U.S. 88 (1976) (federal medicare payments).
57 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, at § 1.5b.
58 IA C. GORDON & H. RosENFIELD, supra note 3, at § 4.4. Ste, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1103 (1976) (Attorney
General); 8 U.S.C. § 1104 (Supp. 11 1978) (Secretary of State).
59 IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, at § 4.4.
60 Accord, 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 3, at 6 (1980 Cum. Supp.).
61 "Distinctions on the basis of nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by the Congress or
the Executive." 617 F.2d at 747 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
62 The Attorney General was found to be acting within the broad enforcement powers delegated to
him in the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1976). Section 1103(a) of the
Act charges the Attorney General with "the administration and enforcement" of the Act and directs him
to "establish such regulations ... and perform such other acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his
authority under the provisions of" the Act. The Attorney General is empowered by section 1351(a)(9) to
order the deportation of any nonimmigrant alien who fails to comply with the conditions of such status.
The President was found to be acting within the power granted by 22 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976), which
provides that whenever "any 'citizen of the United States has been unjustly deprived of his liberty by or
under the authority of any foreign government. . . if [his] release is unreasonably delayed or refused, the
President shall use such means, not amounting to acts of war, as he may think necessary and proper to
obtain or effectuate the release."
63 The district court noted that although the Attorney General's delegated powers to promulgate
regulations for aliens and to establish conditions for entry and deportation were drawn broadly, they were
also drawn neutrally. 481 F. Supp. at 1140-41. The court found that Congress had not intended to grant
authority to discriminate among aliens on the basis of national origin, citing examples of Congress's disdain for discrimination based on rationality (42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a, 2000b, 2000c-6, 2000d, 2000e-2, 1983,
1985 (1976)). The court also rejected the argument that the President acted within the authority granted
by, 22 U.S.C. § 1732, declaring that section 1732 "does not act to authorize the Chief Executive to abrogate individual rights guaranteed by the Constitution." 481 F. Supp. at 1141 n.7.
64 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952).
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undivided whole lacks power" 65 will the President's act be unconstitutional. Second, a President acting without the express or implied approval or disapproval of
Congress possesses intermediate authority. In this "zone of twilight in which [the
President] and Congress may have concurrent authority, '66 the constitutionality
of the Executive's action will "depend on the imperatives of events and contemporary imponderables rather than on abstract theories of law." 67 Finally, a President acting incompatibly with Congress's express or implied will can rely only
on his constitutional powers less any constitutional powers Congress has over the
68
matter.
Having found no delegated congressional authority, the Narenji district court
determined the President's directive was on the second level. 6 9 The court noted
that the President and Congress had concurrent, but not equal, responsibility
over immigration and therefore tested the directive's constitutionality by examining the "imperative of events and contemporary imponderables" and applying
"certain constitutional precepts."' 70 Because the President was acting solely on
his own foreign affairs power, the court applied a balancing test. 7' The court
weighed "the Constitution's abhorrence of discrimination based on national origin, the need to protect against improper assertions of executive power in those
areas where the Constitution has placed with the elected representatives of the
Congress the primary responsibility for action, and the executive's need for freedom of action in international affairs."' 72 Without Congress's sanction, the scale
tipped in favor of the Iranian students. 73 Before weighing these factors, however,
the court appeared to have already decided the issue:
To allow the executive to, in effect, delegate to itself the power to abrogate the
important, constitutionally protected right to equal protection of the laws under the
statutes governing immigration when Congress, which has primary responsibility for
the policy decisions in immigration matters, has not acted, exceeds the proper bound74
aries within which the three branches of our constitutional government coexist.
The court's statement suggests it would be impossible for the President's foreign affairs power alone, or in combination with any independent immigration
power derivative from the foreign affairs power, to outweigh an alien's equal
protection claim. By this, the court effectively reduced the balancing of the
alien's equal protection rights against the President's powers to a determination
of whether the equal protection claim is valid. If it is valid, the presidential
directive will always be outweighed as long as Congress has not added its weight
to the balance by delegating immigration power to the President. Yet, without
elaboration, the court states that the Executive has many opportunities in immigration law to "invoke its authority to conduct foreign policy and thereby dele65 Id at 636-37.
66 Id at 637.
67 Id

68 Id
69 481 F. Supp. at 1142. Had the court of appeals applied the Youngstown Steel analysis, it would have
placed the presidential directive on the first level. 617 F.2d at 747.
70 481 F. Supp. at 1143.
71 See text accompanying notes 100-14 infra.
72 481 F. Supp. at 1145.
73 Id, citig Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958) (law denying United States passports to American citizens who refuse to sign non-communist affidavits held unconstitutional).
74 481 F. Supp. at 1143.
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gate to itself the authority to assume the role of Congress." 7 5 Evidently, the court
did not consider selective enforcement of immigration laws based on national
origin one of those many opportunities.
Although selective enforcement of immigration laws was not in issue,
Supreme Court dicta in Hampton v.Mow Sun Wong 76 and later lower court decisions in similar cases 77 provide at least some support for rejecting the district
court's insinuation that the President's foreign affairs power alone or in combination with its derivative immigration power can never surpass an alien's valid
equal protection claim. The plaintiffs in Mow Sun Wong challenged regulations
promulgated by the Civil Service Commission which excluded persons other
than American citizens and natives of Samoa from employment in most federal
service positions. The Supreme Court invalidated the regulations as outside the
scope of the Commission's powers. The Court did, however, assume without deciding78 that although the Commission lacked the power,7 9 had Congress or the
President imposed the regulation, it would be justified as "providing an incentive
for aliens to become naturalized, or possiby even as providing the President with an
expendable token for treaty negotiatingpurposes.'"8"
The government justified discriminating between citizens and aliens on the
ground that such discrimination enabled the President to "offer employment opportunities to citizens of a given country in exchange for reciprocal concessionsan offer he could not make if those aliens were already eligible for federal jobs."8 1
This suggests allowing executive discrimination among aliens based on nationality to implement foreign policy. While the discrimination at issue in Mow Sun
Wong was not pure selective enforcement, it stemmed from manipulation of a
for federal jobs-which falls under
matter legislated by Congress-eligibility
82
Congress's broad immigration power.
President Ford responded to the Court's decision in Mow Sun Wong by issu83
ing an executive order barring aliens from virtually all federal service jobs.
Thereafter, lower federal courts were left with the task of weighing the justifications suggested by the Supreme Court. One court in upholding the executive
order treated the Supreme Court dictum as though it were binding.84 Another,
basing its justification on the incentive to naturalize, also found alien eligibility
for federal jobs properly the President's concern because "the foreign affairs powers of the President are interwoven with the general policy of the federal government towards aliens."'8 5 These decisions' value in supporting the existence of
75 Id at 1145.
76 426 U.S. 88, 105 (1976).
77 E.g., Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739 (9th Cir. 1980); Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d
1281 (7th Cir. 1978); Ramos v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 430 F. Supp. 422 (D.P.R. 1977).
78 Justices Brennan and Marshall, whose votes were necessary for a majority, joined with the understanding that this constitutional question was reserved. 426 U.S. at 117.
79 Id at 114.
80 Id at 105 (emphasis added).
81 Id at 104.
82 Likewise, Yuen v. Internal Revenue Service, 497 F. Supp. 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), recognized that
federal employment legislation (31 U.S.C. § 699b (Supp. 111978)) provides Congress or the President with
a foreign policy tool--"a bargaining chip . . . in negotiating defense alliances." 497 F. Supp. at 1039,
83 Exec. Order No. 11935 (1976), 3 C.F.R. 146 (1977).
84 Ramos v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 430 F. Supp. 422, 424 (D.P.R. 1977). See Mow Sun
Wong v. Hampton, 435 F. Supp. 37, 45 n.10 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
85 Mow Sun Wong v. Campbell, 626 F.2d 739, 745 (9th Cir. 1980).
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independent presidential immigration power is greatly diminished by the fact
that President Ford was acting pursuant to duly delegated congressional authority.

86

Recognition of an independent presidential immigration power would
strengthen the President's claim of authority to use selective enforcement of immigration laws as an instrument of foreign policy. While not relying on Congress
to delegate him the power to enforce selectively immigration laws, the President
could assert two separate federal powers-the foreign affairs power and his own
independent immigration power-to combat aliens' equal protection claims.
The immigration power, now recognized as vested in Congress, is given great
deference and minimal judicial review. 8 7 A presidential immigration power
would likely be treated similarly, and when combined with the foreign affairs
power would create a formidable barrier for aliens' constitutional claims. Absent
recognition of an independent presidential immigration power, the Executive's
power to enforce selectively immigration laws to implement foreign policy is derived solely from his foreign affairs power and whatever authority Congress delegates to him.
IV.

Weighing Aliens' Equal Protection Rights Against the
Implicated Federal Powers

After it determines whether the complaining aliens have a facially valid
equal protection claim and whether the President acted solely on his foreign affairs power or in combination with the immigration power independently possessed by him or delegated by Congress, a court will determine the
constitutionality of the presidential directive. The outcome will be greatly affected by (1) the intensity with which the judiciary scrutinizes the proposed justifications for the discriminatory classification, 88 (2) the equal protection standard
used for federal discrimination based on nationality, and (3) any presumptions
attached in the reviewing process.
A. JudicialReview
1. Judicial Review of Immigration Measures
The intensity of judicial scrutiny given a presidential directive for selective
enforcement of immigration laws will depend upon whether the court finds that
the directive implicates the immigration power. Since courts have traditionally
scrutinized congressional immigration legislation less closely than presidential
foreign policy actions, 8 9 the level ofjudicial scrutiny will be lowered if Congress is
viewed as having delegated enforcement power to the Executive or perhaps if the
President is viewed as having an independent immigration power.
Aliens may interject equal protection claims against federal laws affecting
their rights to work,9° to receive welfare payments, 9 ' and even to espouse certain
86

5 U.S.C. §§ 3301, 3302 (1976).

87

See text accompanying notes 89-99 infra.

88

For one commentator's explanation of the level of judicial review in Narenji v. Civileul, see Note,

Aliens-Constitutionaityof DiscriminationBased on National Origin, 21 HARV. INT'L. L.J. 467 (1980).
89 See text accompanying notes 94-103 infia.

90

Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
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political views. 92 The laws challenged will receive minimal judicial scrutiny,
however. 93 As the Supreme Court explained in Harisades v. Shaughnessy, "any
policy toward aliens is vitally and intricately interwoven with contemporaneous
policies in regard to the conduct of foreign relations . . . [and] exclusively entrusted to the political branches as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or
interference." 94 In Mathews v. Dzia, 95 the Court acknowledged that classifications among aliens may "implicate our relations with foreign powers" and "must
be defined in light of changing political and economic circumstances. ' 96 The
Court cautioned against adopting "[a]ny rule of constitutional law that would
inhibit the flexibility of the'97 political branches of government to respond to
changing world conditions.
The courts have shown Congress great deference in upholding legislation
which discriminates against aliens generally or against specific alien groups. 98
The likelihood of a drastic shift in the intensity of judicial scrutiny in "immigration" cases is small. As Justice Frankfurter observed in Galvan v. Press,9 9 the judiciary is not writing on a clean slate, nor is there merely a page of history written
on the extent of Congress's immigration power.
2.

Judicial Review of the Conduct of Foreign Affairs

Unless executive conduct of foreign affairs involves a political question and
is thus nonjusticiable, 00° such conduct is subject to a balancing test. The courts
weigh the foreign affairs interest served by the conduct against the constitutional
rights which the conduct jeopardizes. Where it is a United States citizen whose
rights are sacrificed, the courts have usually held his constitutional rights to prevail.10 1 However, where it is an alien whose rights are sacrificed, the alien's rights
prevail less often 10 2 because Congress's "largely immune" 10 3 immigration power
is considered in combination with the foreign affairs power.
For example, after finding the President's and Attorney General's actions in
Narenji to be expressly authorized by Congress, the District of Columbia Circuit
applied the limited standard of judicial review applicable to cases challenging
Congress's immigration power.10 4 The trial court, however, had applied the bal91 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
92 Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
93 Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 n.5, 796 n.7 (1977).
94 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 588-89.
95 Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. at 81.
96 Id
97 Id
98 Set e.g., Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976); Galvan v. Press,
347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
99 347 U.S. at 530.
100 Many foreign affairs matters-for example, recognition of national governments, sovereign immunity, territorial disputes, and certain treaty decisions-are held to involve political questions and are therefore deemed nonjusticiable. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962), sets forth the criteria to be applied in
determining whether a question is justiciable.
101 E.g., New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964); Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Youngstown Steel & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). But see Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1964).
102 E.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580 (1952).
103 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. at 588-89.
104 617 F.2d at 747.
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ancing test because it believed both executive officers acted solely upon their
foreign affairs power.1 0 5 Application of the balancing test regardless of whether
the immigration power is implicated is preferable if aliens' constitutional rights
are ever to be recognized as substantial enough to invalidate directives like the
one aimed at Iranian students. With a balancing test, the strength of aliens'
equal protection claims will be compared with the justifications asserted by the
government. The mere fact that the selective enforcement has a rational basis is
insufficient to render the presidential action constitutional.1 0 6 Rather, the rational basis must outweigh the discrimination suffered by the aliens. While the
right invalidated by the challenged regulation in Narenji-the right to be free
from discriminatory registration and its accompanying penalties-is not overwhelmingly substantial, the government's proposed justifications, while rational,
07
were in practice even less substantial than the aliens' rights.'
Presidential foreign policy actions are presumed to be in the national interest 10 8 and the judicial review given them is narrow. Thus, the justifications offered for selective enforcement of immigration laws to implement foreign policy
may go largely unquestioned. The judiciary's recognition that the success of foreign negotiations often depends on secrecy and dispatch' 0 9 further frees this already loose rein. As the Supreme Court has stated:
It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review
and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held se-

cret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into executive confidences. But
even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to
foreign policy is political, not1 judicial . .

large elements of prophecy. 10

.

.They are delicate, complex, and involve

The judiciary's acknowledgment of the discretion and secrecy with which
the President must conduct foreign affairs, together with the traditionally limited
judicial scrutiny of immigration laws and regulations, may render the review process in cases such as Narenji entirely "toothless." 1 1' In the name of foreign affairs
the government is allowed to "explain or justify its conduct without presenting a
1 t 12
complete exposition of the events and considerations giving rise to its actions.
In fact, the Second Circuit has found the Supreme Court to be "willing to presume the existence of a national interest sufficient to justify the unequal treatment of aliens or a particular class [of aliens] even in the absence of an official
government statement on the issue." 113 Deference to presidential directives may
ultimately result in abdication of judicial review. Once the government establishes that its discriminatory actions fall within the context of immigration legislation and delicate foreign policy, the sacrifice of aliens' equal protection claims
4
seems inevitable. 1
105

481 F. Supp. at 1141, 1145.

106 See text accompanying notes 119-22 infra.
107 See text accompanying notes 135-40 infra.
108 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 103 (1976).
109 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
110 C.& S. Air Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, I 11 (1957), cited in Olegario v. United States,
629 F.2d 204, 232 (1980).
111 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 805 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
112 Olegario v. United States, 629 F.2d at 232.
113 Id
114 See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. at 805 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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The Equal Protection StandardforFederal DiscriminationBased on National Origin

Closely connected with the intensity of judicial scrutiny is the standard by
which courts measure discriminatory classifications. The Supreme Court has interpreted the fifth amendment to require the federal government to provide
equal protection just as the states are required by the fourteenth amendment." 15
The two amendments are not, however, coextensive. Nationality-based distinctions drawn by states merit strict judicial scrutiny to determine whether they
further a "compelling government interest."' 16 On the other hand, the standard
for reviewing similar, federally-drawn distinctions is not so clearly defined.
In 1976, the Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,' 17 the Supreme Court held that any
nationality-based discrimination which is federal in origin and which has a nationwide impact requires an "overriding national interest."' 1 8 The Court stated:
"When the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest as justification for a discriminatory rule which would violate the Equal Protection Clause
if adopted by a state, due process requires that there be a legitimate basis for
presuming that the rule was actually intended to serve that interest." 1 9 The
Court added that if Congress or the President' 20 expressly mandated the discrimination, the Court "might presume that any interest which might rationally be
served by the rule did in fact give rise to its adoption."'12 1 Thus, a rational basis
approach is warranted when the President or Congress authorizes the discrimina22
tion.'
In Mathews v. Diaz,' 23 decided the same day as Mow Sun Wong, the issue was
not whether discrimination between aliens and citizens is permissible, but
"whether the statutory discrimination, within a class of aliens-allowing [medicare] benefits to some but not to others-is permissible."'124 The Court upheld
the requirements of permanent resident status and five year residency without
mentioning an "overriding national interest." The Court instead seemed to reunconstitutional only if the proposed
vert to a test which would find the law
125
justifications were "wholly irrational."'
A year later, in Fiallo v. Bell, 126 the Supreme Court upheld a statute which
discriminated on the basis of gender and legitimacy of birth among aliens seeking
admission to the United States. Sections of the Immigration and Nationality Act
have the effect of excluding the relationship between an illegitimate child and his
natural father, as opposed to his natural mother, from the special preference immigration status accorded a "child" or "parent" of a United States citizen or
115 Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); Railway Express v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949)
(Jackson, J., concurring); L. HENKIN, supra note 24, at 257.
116 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971). Accord, Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642
(1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721 (1973).
117 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (regulation prohibiting employment of aliens in most federal service positions
held unconstitutional).

118 Id at 100.
119 Id at 103.
120 The Court did not indicate whether the President is acting on his own power or that delegated to
him by Congress.
121 426 U.S. at 103.
122 See Matz, The Burger Court and Alienage Classifcations, 31 OKLA. L. REv. 671, 685 (1978).
123 426 U.S. 67 (1976).
124 Id at 80.
125
126

Id at 83.
430 U.S. 787 (1977).
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lawful permanent resident. In supporting Congress's policy choice in this immigration legislation, the Court quoted from an earlier first amendment decision,
Kleindienst v. Mandel, 12 7 in which the Attorney General excluded aliens pursuant
to immigration power delegated by Congress: "[W]hen the Executive exercises
this [delegated] power negatively on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona
fide reason, the courts will neither look behind the exercise of that discretion, nor
test it by balancing its justification against"'128 the constitutional right asserted.
In analyzing the impact of these Supreme Court decisions upon the constitutionality of a foreign policy directive to selectively enforce immigration laws
against aliens of a particular nationality, the bases of the discrimination involved
in these cases and in Narenji must be distinguished. In Mow Sun Wong, the Court
distinguished between United States citizens and aliens, not among aliens. Although the challenged statutes in Diaz and Fallo divided aliens into two classifications, the division was based not on nationality but on other grounds12 9 _
permanent resident status and five year residency in .Diaz, and gender and illegitimacy in Fiallo. The Court in Diaz and Fiallo did not apply the "overriding
national interest" standard of Mow Sun Wong; instead, it relied on the "largely
immune" congressional power to legislate matters affecting aliens.
Because no recent Supreme Court cases have involved discrimination among
aliens based on nationality, 130 the proper standard of review to be applied in
such cases is uncertain. The district court and appellate court in Narenji each
profess to apply the "overriding national interest" standard, but interpret this
standard differently. The court of appeals applied the rational basis test in finding an "overriding national interest."' 3 ' The court erred, however, in citing Diaz
and Fiallo, and not Mow Sun Wong, as authority for applying this test, 132 since
neither of these cases distinguished among aliens on the basis of their nationality
nor asserted the "overriding national interest" standard.
The Narenji district court ignored Mow Sun Wong's assertion that any rational interest which might justify the action should be presumed to do so if
Congress or the President expressly mandate the discrimination.' 33 Instead of
applying a rational basis test to the government's justification, 34 the court balanced these justifications against the aliens' equal protection claim, but did not
find an "overriding national interest." In evaluating the justifications asserted by
127 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
128 430 U.S. at 794-95, quoting 408 U.S. at 770.
129 The Supreme Court has rejected the distinction drawn between discriminating against all aliens
and discriminating among aliens in a state statute context. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1972).
130 The Supreme Court has, however, decided earlier cases involving nationality-based discrimination
among aliens. See, e.g., Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (California statute prohibiting Japanese
from procuring fishing licenses held unconstitutional); Wing Wo v. United States, 163 U.S. 228 (1896)
(procedures for deporting Chinese aliens upheld); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893)
(federal registration of Chinese aliens upheld); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (San Francisco
ordinance regarding operation of laundries by Chinese held unconstitutional).
131 617 F.2d at 747.
132 Id. at 748.
133 Perhaps this was because it found the President lacked authority (relying solely on his foreign affairs power) to so mandate.
134 The government argued that three "overriding national interests" justified the discriminatory regu-

lation: (1) the need to protect the hostages held in Iran by quelling potential domestic violence; (2) the
need to express to the Iranian government this country's denunciation of the embassy takeover; and (3) the
need to identify Iranian students to assist in developiong appropriate responses to the crisis in Iran. 481 F.
Supp. at 1144.
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the government, the court found that only the asserted interest in protecting the
13 5
American hostages in Iran deserved consideration for the label "overriding."'
36
The court focused on what it called the "tenuous"'
cause and effect relationship between the presence of Iranian students in the United States and protecting
the hostages in Iran. The government argued that the Iranian students' presence
in the United States might provoke acts of violence against them, and that such
acts might cause a "hostile counterreaction" in Iran. 37 The court rejected this
argument, noting that the regulation was designed only to identify and expel
Iranian students illegally in the country. There was no assurance that Iranian
students legally in the country would not provoke violence.13 8 The court found
"conly a psychological purpose for the regulation, its intent being one of assuaging
the anger of the American people by demonstrating that something was being
done in the face of crisis."' 3 9 The regulation did not support a legitimate rational interest which would "excuse the wholesale nullification of the rights of the
40
students involved."'
V.

Ramifications and Recommendations

The judiciary's treatment of selective enforcement of immigration laws as an
instrument of foreign policy will depend largely on which federal powers are juxtaposed against the aliens' equal protection claims. If the courts view the President's actions as authorized by a broad congressional delegation of enforcement
power, the President's authority will be at its highest and judicial review will be
minimal.' 4 1 Finding an "overriding national interest" will be reduced to a rational basis inquiry. If the President mandates a selective enforcement campaign, the campaign will be presumed to enjoy any rational basis the President
asserts as its justification. The already narrow judicial review may be further
restricted if the foreign policy assertedly involved requires secrecy and dispatch.
In the face of such limited scrutiny, it is not surprising the Narenji district
court feared that under the guise of foreign policy the President could order the
selective enforcement of immigration laws against aliens of a particular nationality, even though little correlation exists between the action taken and the national interest asserted. Two factors prevent the exercise of excessive executive
power, however. First, the President will not likely view selective enforcement of
immigration laws as a useful tool in many foreign affairs situations. Second, the
judiciary may characterize the assertion of executive power differently and
thereby obtain a different result. For example, a court may find the President to
be acting in the immigration field without congressional authorization, and hold
his actions to be unconstitutional, absent recognition of an independent presidential immigration power, by balancing only his foreign affairs power against
aliens' rights. If the courts recognize an independent presidential immigration
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

481 F. Supp. at 1144.
Id at 1145.
Id at 1144.
Id
Id at 1144-45.
Id at 1145.
See text accompanying notes 65-68 and 89-99 supra.
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power derived from the foreign affairs power, ' 42 however, a presidential directive
to enforce immigration laws selectively might withstand a constitutional challenge if the court treats this independent immigration power with the same deference and minimal review given Congress's immigration power.
In the Iranian crisis, the President was specifically delegated by statute wide
powers for a situation infrequent in our country's history: detention of American
citizens by foreign captors. The Immigration and Nationalilty Act, which could
have accorded the President power to demand selective enforcement, delegates
the President no such authority. Therefore, the situation most likely to arise in
the future would involve the President acting pursuant solely to his foreign affairs
power and the Attorney General acting pursuant to both broad delegated congressional authority and the President's foreign affairs directive or general foreign
policy guidelines. Because the Attorney General's regulation would rest on delegated immigration power as well as the foreign affairs power, any constitutional
challenge of the regulation would likely receive the narrowest judicial review
even though only the Attorney General, not the President, acted pursuant to the
immigration power.
V.

Conclusion

A potential presidential foreign policy instrument emerges from the division
of federal powers and the judiciary's deference to foreign relations and immigration. Only once has a President mandated enforcement of immigration laws
against aliens of a particular nationality to achieve foreign policy goals. Whether
the President will act similarly in the future will depend on international events
and on whether the courts recognize a presidential foreign affairs power in immigration that outweighs aliens' equal protection claims.
VangJ McDonald

142 Se text accompanying notes 60-87 supra.

